Inflation, saving and participation by Brian Motley
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Inflation, Saving and Participation 
The Administration's economic-policy 
package has the twin objectives of reducing 
inflation and stimulating economic growth. 
To lower inflation, reliance is being placed on 
monetary policy, through a gradual but 
persistent reduction in the rate of expansion 
of the nation's money supply. Meanwhile, 
the task of  stimulating real growth has been 
assigned to fiscal policy. Cutbacks in 
government spending, reductions in 
marginal tax rates, and more liberal treatment 
of depreciation are designed to encourage 
households to supply more labor and save a 
larger proportion of  their incomes, and also to 
induce businesses to use those savings to 
invest in new plant and equipment. Thus the 
fiscal package should produce more rapid 
output growth by increasing both the supply 
of labor and its productivity. 
To the extent that the fiscal side of the 
program is successful in stimulating real 
growth, the task of reducing inflation will be 
made that much easier. For one reason, 
higher levels of real GNP produce larger tax 
revenues and smaller expenditures on 
transfer payments, and hence tend to reduce 
the Federal deficit. With a smaller 
deficit -and hence less issuance of 
government bonds-the Federal Reserve has 
an easier job of slowing monetary growth. 
Second, faster real output growth means a 
smaller inflationary impact of a given rate of 
monetary expansion, since members of the 
public will want to hold larger stocks of 
money as their real incomes rise. 
Analysts have long recognized these effects 
of faster output growth in reducing inflation. 
However, both economic theory and 
empirical evidence suggest that a reduced 
inflation rate will have important feedback 
effects on output growth, because a lessening 
of inflation will affect labor supply and 
productivity. These effects of reduced 
inflation will be in addition to and separate 
from the direct effects of fiscal policy. 
The last ten years have witnessed two major 
inflation-related developments which have 
influenced the nahon's rate of  economic 
growth-an increase in female labor-force 
participation and a decline in the private 
saving rate. If inflation is brought under 
control in the 1980's, however, the saving 
rate could rise and the growth in female 
participation could slow. 
Inflation and participation 
If wages and prices always moved together, 
inflation would not affect families' 
labor-force decisions, which are 
fundamentally determined by the real wage: 
the quantity of consumer goods the family 
can buy in exchange for an hour of its labor 
time. Typically, however, wages are less 
flexible than prices, and hence do not move 
precisely in line with prices in the short-run. 
Most wage contracts are three-year contracts, 
with cost-of-living adjustments generally 
made only once a year. Salaries similarly are 
usually changed only once a year. As a result, 
an unexpected acceleration in the inflation 
rate acts immediately to reduce families' real 
wages, even if  their wages fully keep up with 
inflation in the long run. 
The progressive tax system has si m i  lar effects. 
If  wages rise in the same proportion as prices, 
the tax structure will tend to push families 
into higher tax brackets, reducing their after-
tax real incomes. Even if legislators respond 
to this situation by adjusting tax schedules 
(which frequently they fail to do, of course), 
the adjustment takes time to enact and in the 
meantime after-tax real wages are lower. 
Households, when faced with a temporary 
reduction in real wages, generally seek to 
avoid a parallel reduction in consumption. 
They can do this by having additional family 
members look for jobs. Thus one wou  Id 
expect sudden bursts of inflation to be 
associated with increases in labor-force 
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individuals (such as married women) who 
traditionally have not been primary 
bread-winners for their families. 
Moreover, many new participants will 
remain permanently in the work force and 
will not withdraw even if  wages later catch up 
with prices. In the first place, changing 
participation rates-as, for example, when a 
married woman takes a job outside the home 
-generally require a major change in a 
family's domestic living arrangements which 
may be difficult or inconvenient to reverse. 
Second, whatever the initial impetus, 
increased participation may make possible a 
higher material standard of living for a family 
at the expense of reduced leisure time. Often 
the family will be unwilling to return to its 
previous levels of consumption and leisure 
even when later increases in money wages 
make that possible. Of  course, if money 
wages do not fully catch up with prices-as 
was the case following the oil price shocks 
of the 1970's -households are even more 
likely to maintain permanently higher 
participation rates. 
These considerations suggest that a series of 
inflation bursts will be associated with a 
series of jumps in labor-participation rates, 
which produce a gradual "ratcheting up" of 
participation. Increasingly higher rates of 
inflation apparently played a major role in the 
increases in female participation rates in the 
1954-56, 1966-68, 1973-74 and 1976-79 
periods-although changing social attitudes 
and rising real wages also contributed 
significantly to this phenomenon (see Chart 
1). This finding implies, of course, that the 
growth in labor-force participation probably 
would slow down if the Administration and 
the Federal Reserve succeeded in preventing 
the bursts of inflation which have afflicted the 
U.S. economy in the last fifteen years. 
If the rise in participation does slow down, 
faster output growth will be more difficult to 
achieve, and will be possible only with an 
increase in labor productivity. This in turn 
will depend on the nation's willingness to 
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divert resources from current consumption 
into saving and capital formation. 
Fortunately, this could be helped by a 
reduction in the inflation rate. 
I  nflation and saving 
Attaining the goal of higher capital formation 
requires a reversal of the 1970's pattern of a 
decline in the saving rate. In 1980, the 
nation's households and businesses saved 
less than 8 percentoftheircombined after-tax 
incomes. In the 1960-75 period, in contrast, 
this proportion rarely fell below 10 percent 
and exceeded 12 percent much of the time. 
As we argued earlier, a sudden acceleration 
in prices reduces the real income of many 
households because money wages tend to be 
less flexible than prices. But at the same time, 
inflation also increases the real income of 
others. For example, persons who obtain 
their incomes from business profits tend to 
benefit from higher prices. Hence, we cannot 
easi Iy predict the net effect of such 
inflation-induced redistributions of 
income-since households which lose from 
inflation will attempt to maintain their 
existing standards of living by saving less, 
while those which benefit will take 
advantage of  the situation to save more. 
However, inflation tends to reduce private 
savings to the extent that it redistributes 
income away from the private sector and into 
the hands of governments through "bracket 
creep". Moreover, to the extent that price 
increases result from external price shocks, 
national savings are hurt because a larger 
share of the income generated by the U.S. 
economy flows into the hands of foreigners. 
Economic theory suggests that household 
decisions to save or to consume will be 
affected by (among other things) the real 
interest rate: that is, by the quantity of 
additional future consumption which can be 
obtained in exchange for a reduction in 
present consumption. This will depend both 
on the nominal after-tax return obtainable on 
savings and on the rate of inflation. If the real 
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nominal return increases or the rate of 
inflation declines-families are likely to save 
a larger proportion of  their incomes in order 
to reap the rewards of  greater future 
consumption. 
However, one would not expect a change in 
the inflation rate to affect household savings 
very much through this route. This is because 
a permanently faster or slower rate of price 
increase also will be reflected in higher or 
lower nominal interest rates, and so will be 
largely neutral so far as the real rate is 
concerned. A progressive tax system may 
alter this conclusion to some extent, because 
if inflation pushes households into higher tax 
brackets without adding to their real returns, 
the real after-tax rate of return will be lowered. 
Temporary changes in the inflation rate will 
not affect households' estimates of  the 
long-ru n trade-off between present and futu re 
consumption and hence shou Id not alter 
aggregate consumption decisions. They may, 
however, alter the form in which saving is 
done. For example, a temporary slowing in 
the rate of  inflation may induce households to 
"stock up" on durable goods. This would 
reduce saving as measured in the national 
accounts because durables purchases are 
treated as consumption ratherthan as savings 
in those accounts. Such an effect should 
properly be viewed as a measurement error 
rather than as a true change in saving 
behavior. 
Although a family may regard a sudden rise in 
its living costs as a temporary phenomenon 
which does not affect its best estimate of the 
long-run trade-off between present and future 
consumption, such an event may add to its 
uncertainty about the future, and so lead it to 
alter its saving rate. Unfortunately, here 
again, economic theory does not enable us to 
predict the direction of this effect. 
A household may view an unexpected burst 
of  inflation which temporarily reduces its real 
income as increasing the probability of 
similar reductions in the future. In such a 
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in order to build up a reserve against such 
income uncertainties. On the other hand, 
unexpected inflation may also cause the 
household to become more uncertain of  the 
real rate of  retu rn it can earn on savi ngs -and 
thus lead itto consume now, when prices are 
known, rather than to set funds aside and risk 
the loss oftheir purchasing power to inflation. 
Again, economic theory does not  enable us to 
predict the effect of inflation on saving. The 
data strongly suggest, however, that the 
higher and more variable rates of inflation 
characteristic of the past decade have 
strongly discouraged saving. Thus the faster 
inflation which began in 1973 initially 
tended to increase private saving, but this 
development was reversed in 1974, and 
since then saving rates have trended 
downward amidst violent fluctuations in 
inflation rates. These fluctuations-eithei by 
redistributing income or by complicating 
future planning-apparently have tended to 
make households stress current consumption 
at the expense of the future. The.persistence 
of low saving rates in 1980-81, in the face of 
high real interest rates, suggests that 
households remain very uncertain about the 
long-term inflation outlook. 
This argument suggests that a policy which 
succeeds in lowering the average rate of 
inflation-and which also makes it more 
predictable-will have a beneficial effect on 
the saving rate. The real return to saving will 
become more certain, so that households will 
be more willing to save by purchasing 
financial assets. Such purchases will in turn 
provide the funds needed by business to 
accumulate capital and boost productivity. 
This beneficial effect should supplement the 
effects of the President's fiscal package and 
help to offset the slower growth of labor-force 
participation likely to result from lowered 
inflation. 
Brian Motley 
((~  ... 
~ SS"1::> 1SI:II:I 
.J!I~::>  'O)SpU~.I:1 u~S 
lS.l ·ON llWHld 
OIVd 
l~V  lSOd ·s·n 
llVW SSV1::> lSHI:I 
BANKING DATA-TWELFTH FEDERAL RESERVE DISTRICT 
(Dollar amounts in millions) 
Selected Assets and Liabilities 
large Commercial Banks 
loans (gross, adjusted) and investments* 
loans (gross, adjusted) - total # 
Commercial and industrial 
Real estate 
loans to individuals 
Securities loans 
U.s. Treasury securities* 
Other securities* 
Demand deposits - total# 
Demand deposits - adjusted 
Savings deposits - total 
Time deposits - total # 
Individuals, part. & corp. 








































Weekly Averages  Weekended  Weekended 
of Daily Figures 
Member Bank Reserve Position 
Excess Reserves (+  )/Deficiency (  -) 
Borrowings 
Net free reserves (+  )/Net borrowed( -) 
* Excludes trading account securities. 
#  Includes items not shown separately. 
9/16/81  9/9/81 
249  117 
20  331 
229  215 
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Change from 
year ago 
Dollar  Percent 
11,441  8.1 
12,420  10.5 
4,740  13.7 
6,194  12.9 
902  - 3.8 
591  62.5 
785  - 12.1 
190  - 1.2 
4,808  - 10.3 
5,680  - 16.8 
20  0.1 
20,907  32.6 
21,287  38.2 
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